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Abstract
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s macroeconomy featured high and fluctuating inflation and
oscillating GDP growth rates. After Turkey’s April 1999 elections, Turkey adopted a new
economic program in coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with three
goals: fiscal adjustment, structural reform, and an exchange rate commitment. By the end of
the third quarter of 2000, concerns over the pace of structural reform mounted and shortterm interest rates remained high. The new Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
(BRSA) revealed significant corruption within several small banks taken over by the Saving
Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). In November 2000, Demirbank, a private bank that had
developed a balance sheet especially concentrated in government debt assets and
increasingly acted as a market maker for those securities, could not meet its overnight
obligations; this forced it to sell government debt in the secondary market. These sales put
significant pressure on overnight rates and created a negative environment for publicly
owned banks. In response, the SDIF took over the bank, after having taken over several
others. In December 2000, the SDIF injected TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) of capital into
the eight SDIF-controlled banks to recapitalize them at a level of 8% of risk-weighted assets.
The capitalization program, depositor guarantee, and the central bank’s successful defense
of the lira calmed the crisis in November and December.
Keywords: broad-based capital injections, broad-based, capital injections, crawling peg,
Demirbank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF),
Turkey
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Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Bank
Recapitalization (2000–2001)
At a Glance
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s
macroeconomy featured high and
fluctuating inflation and oscillating GDP
growth rates (Ekinci 2002). External debt
increased from $66 billion in 1994 to
$104 billion by the end of 1999 (Ekinci
2002).
After Turkey’s April 1999
elections, the country adopted a new
economic program in coordination with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
with three goals: fiscal adjustment,
structural reform, and an exchange rate
commitment (IMF 1999). The exchange
rate commitment entailed a crawling peg
regime with a pre-announced exit
strategy (Ekinci 2002).3
While the economy successfully met
depreciation and cost of borrowing
targets in 2000, other macroeconomic
goals lagged (Ekinci 2002). Annual
inflation was 39% (higher than the 25%
goal), the current account logged a record
deficit at 5% of gross national product
(GNP), and the government realized only
50% of the privatization target (Ekinci
2002). By the end of the third quarter of
2000, concerns over the pace of
structural reform mounted and shortterm interest rates remained high (Ekinci
2002). The new Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency (BRSA) revealed

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To recapitalize 11 SDIF-controlled private
banks to 8% of risk-weighted assets, in response to
market turmoil in November 2000.
Announcement date

December 6, 2000

Operational date

December 7, 2000

Sunset date

n/a

Voluntary vs
involuntary/timeframe

Involuntary

institution
Program size

TL 3.8 quadrillion
($6.1 billion)

Maximum usage per bank

8% of risk-weighted
assets

Capital characteristics

Floating-rate Treasury
securities that paid
quarterly coupons
linked to CBT repo
rate and the average
Treasury bill rate

Outcomes

Calmed markets,
reversed capital
outflows

Key features

The SDIF took over
management of all
re-capitalized banks,
resolving all banks by
2004

Specifically, the exchange rate was pegged to a basket ($1 + DM 1.5 or €0.75) with a gradually declining
monthly rate of depreciation for 18 months (Ekinci 2002). The cumulative rate of depreciation was to reach
20% by the end of 2000; and from July 2001, the basket was to fluctuate within a widening band, reaching
22.5% by year-end 2002 (Ekinci 2002).
3
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significant corruption within several small banks taken over by the Saving Deposit Insurance
Fund (SDIF) (Ekinci 2002).
Given the high interest rates on Turkish lira assets, banks had regularly obtained foreign
currency from abroad and invested in high-yield local debt instruments, exposing
themselves to exchange rate and liquidity risks (Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011). In
November 2000, Demirbank, a private bank that had developed a balance sheet
concentrated in government debt assets and increasingly acted as a market maker for those
securities, could not meet its overnight obligations; this forced it to sell government debt in
the secondary market (Ozatay and Sak 2002; Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011). These sales
put significant pressure on overnight rates and created a negative environment for public
banks (Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011) (See Figure 1). In response, the SDIF took over the
bank (CNN.com 2000).
Figure 1: Weighted average overnight rate, daily data, 1991–2001

Source: Ozatay and Sak 2002.

In December 2000, the SDIF injected TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) of capital into the eight
SDIF-controlled banks at a level of 8% of their risk-weighted assets (IMF 2001). The SDIF
created the capital through the transfer of floating rate Treasury securities to the banks (IMF
2001). The treasury notes paid quarterly coupons linked to borrowing costs and foreign
exchange-linked bonds (IMF 2001). By December 6, 2000, the SDIF had eleven banks under
its control (IMF 2000a).
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Summary Evaluation
By 2004 the SDIF resolved all controlled banks, either through merger or sale (Saving
Deposit Insurance Fund 2004).
The capitalization program, depositor guarantee, and the central bank’s successful defense
of the lira calmed the crisis in November and December (Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim 2011;
Ozatay and Sak 2002). However, the central bank lost almost 20% of its reserves defending
the peg (Ozatay and Sak 2002). The IMF authorized a Supplemental Reserve Facility on
December 21, 2000, to provide an additional $7.5 billion to the central bank (IMF 2000b).
Between December 2000 and December 2002, the Turkish government’s total debt owed to
multilateral institutions increased from approximately $8 billion to $31 billion. As of 2009,
the government still owed $23 billion (Dufour and Orhangazi 2009) (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Outstanding debt to multilateral institutions (in $ millions)

Source: Dufour and Orhangazi 2009.

By February 2001, another currency crisis materialized following a political crisis between
the Prime Minister and the President (Ozatay and Sak 2002). The overnight rate increased
to 2,058% on February 19 and 4,019% on February 20 (Ozatay and Sak 2002). By February
21, the government could no longer defend the peg and let the lira float (Ozatay and Sak
2002). The next day, the lira depreciated from TL 685,000 Liras to the dollar to TL 985,000
to the dollar (Ozatay and Sak 2002).
Dufour and Orhangazi (2009) argue that the debt burden that Turkey took out in attempting
to defend its exchange rate regime and capitalize banks was both unsustainable and a result
of IMF pressure. The full guarantee of depositors along with the necessity that the SDIF take
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over any failing bank amounted to a debt nationalization program; the financial debt burden
shifted to a sovereign debt burden that lasted for a decade after the program (Dufour and
Orhangazi 2009). Kenc, Ibrahim, and Yildirim (2011) argue that as a result of the crisis in
2001, the banking sector became more resilient, with high capital adequacy, high
profitability, and better risk management.
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Turkey Context 2000 - 2001
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
5-bank concentration of banking system

$272.91 billion in 2000
$205.71 billion in 2001
$4,337 in 2000
$3,143 in 2001
As of Q4 2000:
Fitch: BB
Moody’s: S&P: B+
As of Q4 2001:
Fitch: B3
Moody’s: BS&P: B$85.84 billion in 2000
$96.76 billion in 2001
31.82% in 2000
34.58% in 2001
96.51% in 2000
96.76% in 2001
85.43% in 2000
91.28% in 2001

Foreign involvement in banking system

35% foreign owned in 1999/2000

Government ownership of banking system

33% state owned in 1999/2000

Existence of deposit insurance

Deposit insurance backed by SDIF

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank Deposit
Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a package: Turkey’s SDIF bank capital injection was part of two capital
injection programs to recapitalize private and public banks in response to
November and December 2000 market stress. The SDIF transferred
nonperforming loans (NPLs) of the participating banks to an asset management
unit of the SDIF. The BRSA also issued a temporary, full guarantee of depositors.
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) announced the recapitalization
program on November 16, 2000 (IMF 2000a). A December 18, 2000 IMF Letter of Intent
(LoI) further described the program (IMF 2000a). The capital injection to Saving Deposit
Insurance Fund (SDIF) banks was part of two programs designed to recapitalize SDIFcontrolled, one for private banks and one for state-owned banks (Dufour and Orhangazi
2009). The SDIF recapitalized eligible banks on December 7, 2000 (IMF 2000a). In the
December 18, 2000, LoI, the government also announced the creation of a dedicated Asset
Management Unit, in charge of recovering the value of the assets of banks taken over by the
SDIF (IMF 2000a). Both injection programs had the goal of calming capital markets, though
overnight rates again deteriorated in February in response to a political crisis (Ozatay and
Sak 2002).
On December 6, 2000, the BRSA and the government announced a temporary, full guarantee
of depositors and “other creditors (except deposits by owners, deposits in connection with
criminal activities, subordinated debt, and shareholder equity)” (IMF 2000a). The guarantee
covered domestic deposit-taking banks, and the SDIF administered the guarantee in
accordance with Bank Act No. 4389 passed in June 1999 (IMF 2000a).
2. Legal Authority: Bank Act No. 4389 detailed the authorities of the BRSA and SDIF.
The Turkish Parliament passed Bank Act No. 4389 on June 18, 1999, which detailed the
SDIF’s and BRSA’s authority (Turkey 1999). The Bank Act established the BRSA, an entity
independent of the Central Bank of Turkey and the Treasury, which became fully operational
as of August 2000 (IMF 2000a). Article 14 of the Bank Act endowed the BRSA with the right
to dismiss management, appoint new board members, require provisions up to 100% of
deposits, liquidate assets, divest fixed or long-term assets, and take over shares of controlled
banks (Turkey 1999, Article 14). Article 15 of the act specified the duties of the SDIF. In
general, the SDIF had authorization to liquidate, merge, and acquire assets of banks for which
it had “management and control and privileges of shareholders except dividends” (Turkey
1999, Article 14, Section 5[a]). The SDIF had three primary means by which it could execute
this authority.
First, the SDIF could transfer the assets, organization, personnel, and insured deposits of a
controlled bank to a bank that carried out banking operations for the BRSA (Turkey 1999,
Article 14, Section 5[aa]). As of September 7, 2001, Bayindirbank served this function
(Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004). Second, the SDIF could take over losses not exceeding
the value of insured deposits on the condition of owning all of the bank’s equity (Turkey
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1999, Article 14, Section 5[ab]). Third, it could take over shares of the bank through payment
of the share price to shareholders, as determined “by deducting the loss from paid-up
capital” (Turkey 1999, Article 14, Section 5[ac]).
The SDIF was able to “borrow [government securities] in extraordinary situations” from the
Treasury (Turkey 1999, Article 15). Provisional Article 4 of the Bank Act authorized the
BRSA to determine “principles and procedures” for the sale and transfer of banks shares
owned by the SDIF (Turkey 1999, Provisional Article 4).
3. Communications: The BRSA announced the recapitalization program. The Official
Gazette published details of BRSA decisions relating to SDIF-controlled banks.
The BRSA announced the bank recapitalization program on November 16, 2000 (IMF
2000a). A December 18, 2000, IMF Letter of Intent described the program (IMF 2000a).
Article 14 of Bank Act No. 4389 specified that a BRSA “decision related to the revocation of
license for performing banking activities and accepting deposits, or to transfer shares of a
bank to the Fund, or to transfer rights of shareholders except dividends and management
and control shall be published in the Official Gazette” (Turkey 1999, Article 14).
4. Governance: The BRSA and the SDIF administered the capital injection program.
The BRSA and the SDIF administered the capital injection (IMF 2000a). Specifically, the SDIF
became, as per the 1999 Bank Act, a legal entity controlled by the BRSA (IMF 2000a). The
Bank Act created an Asset Management Unit to recover the value of the assets of banks taken
over by the SDIF (IMF 2000a). The BRSA monitored bank balance sheets and income reports
to determine insolvency (IMF 2000a). As of September 2000, the SDIF controlled eight
banks; two more were taken over in October and a third on December 6 (IMF 2000a).
5. Size of the program: There was no predetermined size. The SDIF injected in total
TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) worth of capital on December 7, 2000. The SDIF
borrowed $6.1 billion in domestic and foreign currency from the Treasury to
cover the cost of capital.
Capital injections came in two phases. The SDIF injected capital into the eight banks
controlled prior to October on December 7, 2000 (IMF 2000a). The SDIF took over three
other banks between October and December 2000 (IMF 2000a). The SDIF also injected these
banks with additional capital amounting to 8% of their risk-weighted assets (IMF 2000a).
The amount of injected capital to all 11 banks totaled TL 3.8 quadrillion ($6.1 billion) (IMF
2001). However, at the time, estimates of SDIF bank capital losses from increases in interest
rates, securities portfolio losses, and takeovers were significantly higher (IMF 2001). By
April 31, 2001, total public sector debt required to cover losses and NPLs was estimated as
high as TL 13.7 quadrillion ($22 billion) (IMF 2001).
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The SDIF borrowed $6.1 billion from the Treasury on November 16 in foreign currency and
TL with a two-year grace period and repayment over the subsequent 10 years to cover the
cost of capital injected in these eight banks (IMF 2000a).
6. Eligible institutions: The 11 banks taken over by the SDIF by December 6, 2000,
receiving capital injections were eligible for the program.
The eight SDIF-controlled banks prior to October 2000 and the three banks taken over in
October and December 2000 were injected with capital (IMF 2000a). The SDIF recapitalized
the eight banks controlled prior to October 2000 on December 6, 2000 and recapitalized the
three banks taken over in October and December 2000 in subsequent months (IMF 2000a).
Figure 3: Partial list of banks taken over by the SDIF, 1999–2001

Source: Ozatay and Sak 2002.

As of November 16, 2000, the SDIF had 10 banks under its control (IMF 2000a). The SDIF
also financially restructured and resolved the two banks taken over in October 2000 and
Demirbank, though on a delayed timetable (IMF 2000a). Demirbank was eventually acquired
by HSBC in 2001 (Dufour and Orhangazi 2009).
7. Individual participation limits: The SDIF recapitalized eligible banks up to 8% of
risk-weighted assets.
The SDIF recapitalized eligible banks through a transfer of government securities to a level
of at least 8% of risk weighted assets (IMF 2000a).
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After the November 2000 market turmoil, overnight rates again peaked in February
following a political crisis (Ozatay and Sak 2002). The SDIF took over more banks between
February and November 2001 (Ozatay and Sak 2002).
8. Capital characteristics: The SDIF created the capital by transferring floating-rate
Treasury securities.
The SDIF created the capital through the transfer of floating-rate Treasury securities to the
banks (IMF 2001). The Treasury notes paid quarterly coupons linked to borrowing costs and
foreign exchange–linked bonds (IMF 2001). Coupons on floating-rate notes were linked to
both the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) repo rate and the average Treasury bill rate (IMF
2001). Floating-rate notes were preferable given the tight monetary conditions, severe
interest rate shocks, and bank exposure to interest rate risk (IMF 2001). Losses were written
off against capital thereby created (IMF 2000a). Loan-loss provisions were tax deductible to
facilitate proper provisioning (IMF 2001).
By the end of March 2001, estimated losses in market value of Treasury securities held by
SDIF banks and recapitalization notes issued in December 2000 totaled TL 2.5 quadrillion
($1.1 billion) (IMF 2001).
9. Shareholder dilution: The SDIF had the authority to allocate losses to existing
shareholders.
The SDIF could take over shares through payment to shareholders of a share price
determined “by deducting the loss from paid-up capital” (Turkey 1999, Article 14, Section
5[ac]).
10. Existing board and management: The BRSA had the right to transfer to the SDIF all
management and control and privileges of shareholders except dividends.
In the event the BRSA determined that a bank was failing to institute a suitable capital
restoration plan despite having capital ratios below regulatory minimums, the BRSA could
require the bank to skip dividend payments, cease making bonus or similar payments to the
Board of Directors, limit nonprofitable operations, or liquidate inefficient assets (Turkey
1999, Article 14–1). If the bank failed to comply with a suitable capital restoration plan, the
BRSA could transfer the management and control and privileges of shareholders except
dividends to the SDIF (Turkey 1999, Article 14–1). Additionally, the BRSA had the right to
transfer all management and control and privileges of shareholders except dividends of
SDIF-controlled banks to the SDIF if shareholders, who directly or indirectly hold the bank’s
management or control, used bank’s resources for their own interest, and jeopardized “the
secure functioning of the bank” (Turkey 1999, Article 14–1).
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11. Timeframe/exit strategy: The SDIF intended to sell banks controlled by the SDIF
by May 7, 2001. The SDIF did not meet this timeline, though the fund did resolve
all controlled banks by 2004.
As per Turkey’s December 18, 2000, Letter of Intent with the IMF, the SDIF was to select
buyers for all banks by May 7, 2001 (IMF 2000a). Potential buyers were to submit
“expression of interest” letters by December 15, and the BRSA was to notify investors of
approval no later than December 22, 2000 (IMF 2000a).
The SDIF sold Bank Ekspres, Demirbank, Sumerbank, Sitebank, and Tarisbank by 2002,
while other banks under SDIF control were merged (Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004).
As of 2004, the SDIF merged or sold all banks excluding Bayindirbank, which it made a
“transition bank to carry out the asset management function,” and Pamukbank, which the
Fund merged with a public bank (Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004). The status of the
banks taken over by the SDIF as of 2004 is detailed below in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Status of banks taken over by SDIF as of 2004
Bank
Merged Banks
Egebank

Date acquired by SDIF

Notes

12.21.1999

Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001

Yurtbank

12.21.1999

Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001

Yaşarbank

12.21.1999

Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001

Bank Kapital

10.27.2000

Merged with Sumerbank on 01.26.2001

Ulusalbank

02.28.2001

Merged with Sumerbank on 04.17.2001

Interbank

01.07.1999

Merged with Etibank on 06.15.2001

Esbank

12.21.1999

Merged with Etibank on 06.15.2001

03.15.2001

Banking license revoked on 12.07.2001 and the
liquidation process initiated. Later, with the decision
taken in the General Assembly on 04.04.2002,
liquidated and merged with Bayindirbank.

Kentbank

07.09.2001

Banking license revoked on 12.28.2001 and the
liquidation process initiated. Later, with the decision
taken in the General Assembly on 04.04.2002,
liquidated and merged with Bayındırbank.

EGS Bank

07.09.2001

Banking license revoked on 01.18.2002 and merged
with Bayindirbank as of the same date.

Etibank

10.27.2000

Banking license revoked on 12.28.2001 and the
liquidation process initiated. Later, with the decision
taken in the General Assembly on 04.04.2002,
liquidated and merged with Bayindirbank.

Toprakbank

11.30.2001

Banking license revoked as of 30.09.2002 and
merged with Bayindirbank as of the same date.

Bank Ekspres

12.12.1998

Sold to Tekfen Group on 06.30.2001. Tekfenbank A.Ş.
of Bank Ekspres A.Ş. Approved by the BRSA on
10.18.2001.

Demirbank

12.06.2000

On 09.20.2001, HSBC Bank Plc. and the actual share
transfer realized on 10.30.2001.

Sumerbank

12.21.1999

Sold to Oyak Group on 09.08.2001, and the transfer
of Sumerbank to Oyakbank A.Ş. registered on
11.01.2002.

İktisat Bankası

Sold Banks
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07.09.2001

Share transfer agreement signed with Novabank SA
on 12.20.2001, and the share transfer made on
01.25.2002.

07.09.2001

Share transfer agreement regarding the transfer to
Denizbank A.Ş. signed on 10.21.2002 and the actual
share transfer completed as of 10.25.2002.
Denizbank A.Ş. and Tarişbank approved by the BRSA
on 12.19.2002 and the merger completed on
12.27.2002.

Banks in the Liquidation Process as of March 2004

Türkbank

11.06.1997

Dissolution and liquidation of the bank decided at
the extraordinary General Assembly meeting held on
08.09.2002, registered in the Trade Registry Office
on 14.08.2002, and announced in the Trade Registry
Gazette dated 08.19.2002 and numbered 5616. In
the extraordinary General Assembly meeting of the
bank on 04.09.2003, the liquidation balance sheet
dated 08.14.2002 was approved and new liquidators
were appointed. With the decision of the Liquidation
Board dated 12.01.2003, all branches were
systematically closed, and with the decision dated
12.02.2003, it was decided to terminate the
employment contracts of all personnel.

Banks whose Management and Supervision Has Been Transferred to the Fund
Kıbrıs
Kredi
27.09.2000
Liquidation studies continue.
Bankası

İmar Bankası

03.07.2003

The Banking Regulation and Supervision Board's
decision dated 07.03.2003 and numbered 1085,
pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 14 of Bank Act
No. 4389, revoked the permission of İmar Bank to
conduct banking transactions and to accept deposits,
and the management and control of the company has
been transferred to the Fund. A lawsuit was filed on
02.19.2004 for the bankruptcy of the bank.

Banks within the structure of the SDIF
Bayindirbank

Pamukbank

09.07.2001

Selected as the transition bank to carry out the asset
management function.

19.06.2002

With the decision of the Board dated 01.31.2003 and
numbered 978, and the resolution of the Fund Board
of Directors dated 01.31.2003 and numbered 61, the
agreement regarding the restructuring of the debts
of the Çukurova Group to Pamukbank and Yapi ve
Kredi Bankasi A.Ş. signed in 2003. Two investor
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groups submitted proposals to the bank, whose sales
process was restarted. These proposals were found
insufficient by the SDIF Board of Directors on
12.29.2003, and studies were initiated to evaluate
the resolution of the bank by merging it with a public
bank.
Source: Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 2004.
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